Amtrak Engineer not on Phone when the Train Derailed

After doing some research, and comparing dates, I do believe I have found out what roller coaster you are investigating. I was going to post the name of the ride, but I thought that it would be best not to. I don't know if you know this, but there have been several incidents that have occur on the ride, all of which seem to be either:
Mechanical-related
Infrastructure-related
Computer-related
Interestingly, there were plans on removing the ride.
I've also found a video that shows the accident just after the incident occurred. Would you be interested in the video and record of previous breakdowns?
 
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After doing some research, and comparing dates, I do believe I have found out what roller coaster you are investigating. I was going to post the name of the ride, but I thought that it would be best not to. I don't know if you know this, but there have been several incidents that have occur on the ride, all of which seem to be either:
Mechanical-related
Infrastructure-related
Computer-related
Interestingly, there were plans on removing the ride.
I've also found a video that shows the accident just after the incident occurred. Would you be interested in the video and record of previous breakdowns?

It's interesting too that that the same ride was built by the same company that has had quality issues with similar designs in the past in other parks including some Six-Flags parks.

John
 
Hi John, Jordon and everybody.
Jordan, thank you for the offer of the videos etc, but my company has in its possession many videos taken on the day of the incident at the Staffordshire theme Park many of which were recorded by the emergency services during the course of the rescue. Obviously such media cannot be released for any kind of public viewing prior to the outcome of the investigation and any court action that may follow from that, but again thanks for the offer Jordon.

John, you are correct in stating that there had been many technical problems with regard to the operation of this ride which caused it to be taken out of service many times in these few months it had been operating. However, in regard to safety it matters little how many times and how often any piece of equipment may fail, providing in the course of that happening the equipment fails safely meaning that it does not endanger anyone in the process of failure.

I do not believe I am stating anything that is not already widely known in the UK via the British media in advising that the above failsafe process certainly did not happen on the day of this instant. There have been several technical problems with the ride on the day of the incident which meant that the operation had to be suspended several times during the course of the morning. Queues of people waiting to ride had built up, and therefore it was decided to bring a second ride car into service to reduce the queueing as the ride operation resumed in the early afternoon.

In the above, as the service was resuming it was decided to send a first service car around the ride empty of any passengers to test whether any technical problems were still in existence. The empty car was released onto the ride but before it completed the circuit a second car full of passengers was released onto the circuit just at the moment the first car suddenly came to a halt. Systems written into the computer software and braking mechanisms on both the car and track should have brought second car immediately to a halt on detecting two vehicles on the same section of track. However, that system failed to activate and the outcome of that is sadly already known. To put it into a few words, the failsafe system did nothing to fail safely.

The above, was then followed by a totally inadequate incident response procedure which meant that no medical assistance whatsoever could be given to those badly injured and traumatised in the car for over an hour following the accident which is the section of the incident my team has been investigating over the past few weeks. All the foregoing stated, our reports have now gone through the hands of our company legal typist and secretaries and have now been forwarded to the health and safety executive for their perusal and recommendations regarding future course of action.

Anyway, on returning from Stafford in the early part of last week myself and another work colleague immediately found ourselves attending a sewage works in Avonmouth, Bristol to bring in a safety regime for the new plant. Well, they always say “after the Lord Mayors show comes the crap cart.

Actually the plant is one of the most advanced in Europe with everything (and I mean everything) coming into its processes being recycled. The methane gas goes to power generators with their output not only powering the plant was also putting the excess power into the National Grid. The liquid residue then passes through huge settling lagoons where the solids are taken out, dried, processed and then dispatched as fertiliser to farms in the area. The liquid which is left is them further processed until it is so pure it is drinkable, or so I was informed. Needless to say I have not been tempted to sample it.

In the above, what we have not been able to figure out is why the raw sewage coming into the plant is a different colour on various days of the week. On a Monday the colour is a very dark brown which we put down to the Saturday night Guinness and Sunday roast lunches coming into the system (or should I say out of the system). By midweek the colour changes to a much lighter almost khaki colour brown, which we put down to midweek Curries coming out of people systems and into ours.

Despite all the modern techniques of the plant very often at peak periods things can get “choked up” through the huge pumps etc. That is when those who work at the plant have to get down in amongst it and manually “sort it out”. My own work has put me alongside those people for over a week now, and I have to say I have never had so much respect for any group of workers as I have for that workforce. Whatever safety regime we bring in at the plant the above type of operation can never be made 100% safe. However, those who work there certainly know how to look out for one another and that brings about a camaraderie unseen in many workplaces these days.

I hope forum members do not mind me in the second part of this posting introducing a little real-life humour to what seems to be a very serious forum at present.

Bill
 
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I don't mind this at all, Bill. Very, very informative.

We have been slowly implementing systems like that over here as well in conjunction with National Grid as well, which is my electric and gas service company. We donate a pretty sum to their investments and stock portfolio every month. :) I too have respect for workers like that as well. They put up with a lot and work really hard... Let's say they really earn their money. What annoys me is these positions are the first to see pay cuts and job cuts when the budgets get tight.

The failsafe systems for the roller coasters sounds very interesting, almost like those new positive train control systems they are starting to implement over here, and very similar to the one used on those people movers, which have both manual as well as automatic systems in place. The people mover systems, however, are not as safe as we'd think and there have been a few accidents already with those, mostly due to workers ignoring the system messages. (I had a link on one accident, but I lost it...)

John
 
I'd like to provide more info about roller coaster brakes:
There are three types of brakes:
Block Brake
Trim Brake
Station Brake

If you've ever ridden a roller coaster that has a series of brakes (called a 'brake run') mid-way thru the ride, those are trim brakes, which reduce, or 'trim', the speed of the train.

Block brakes are used on roller coasters that operate more than one train at a time. Block brakes are found at the end of a brake run. Block brakes work like signals on a railroad, they have either a 'stop' or 'go' setting. If you've ridden a roller coaster where the train stops just outside the station, it's being stopped by the block brake. There's also a block brake at the station and at the top of the lift hill (the one with the chain on it). If there's only block brakes in the station and the lift hill, then there's only two blocks. There always has to be one 'open' block, so if there's two blocks, then there can only be one train. If you have a block brake at the top of the lift hill, in the station, and at the end of a brake run just before returning to the station, then there's three blocks, meaning up to two trains can operate at a time.

Station brakes hold the train at the station until the ride operator determines that it is safe for the train to depart the station. In order for the ride operator to 'dispatch' a train from the station, then, for example, passenger restraints must be securely 'locked' into position. The 'clicking' sound you hear when you put on the restraints is the locking mechanism to keep the restraints from coming undone and ejecting a passenger from the train.

Hopefully that'll help understand the brakes on a roller coasters.
 
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