Runaway train

It will be interesting how this gets investicated:

"We're not sure what happened, but the engineer did everything by the book. He had parked the train and was waiting for his relief ... somehow, the train got released, Montreal, Maine & Atlantic vice president of marketing Joseph R. McGonigle told Reuters".
 
Let's hope that this was a technical problem, if there had to be anything like this, and not a saboteur at work. The MM&A is a shortline/regional that is trying to come up out of the dust and this is something that they didn't need to happen right now. They nearly lost everything a few years ago when the recession hit.

John
 
There just might be a job opening for a new engineer on that RR, as he was in a hotel for the night, after parking his train.

As there was a flashing FRED on the rear end of the underailed portion of the train, I would assume that it rolled forward downhill, engine first.
 
I wonder if he only engaged the train braking system and not the engine brake as well. The air might of gone out and the train moved.

John
 
Since nobody posted about THIS: Apparently lead loco 5017 suffered a fire after being parked. Local fire department responded, but without consulting the engineer,, the shut down 5017, and they think that may have caused the air brakes to "leak off pressure" and the train starting rolling.
 
its the other side to what would happen if AWVR 777 had derailed! :eek:Still this should not be laughed at I want to say to all of you guys from qubiec on the trainz forums I hope your okay
 
I would think that a Locking Rail Chock, as well as a Blue Flag should be applied to any loco/consist (left running, or parked on a grade) when a crew is away for layover in a motel, awaiting re-crew.

It was my experience that an additional 3 railcars have handbrakes cranked, on all unmanned drafts of railcars.
 
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From the news reports (flawed as they often are) it is difficult to make any sense of what happened. Did the locomotives roll downhill with the train and crash and burn? I saw one report supposedly showing the portion of the train (tank cars) that were still connected to locomotives and that did not roll downhill. That report said part of the train had become disconnect from the rest of the cars and rolled backward into town. Others here are saying the end of the train that rolled but did not explode/burn had a flashing FRED on the last car, indicating the train must have rolled forward (locos first) downhill. Or possibly the train derailed mid-train and the rear end had already rolled past the derailment site? Are trains in Canada allowed to operate only with an engineer and no conductor? The railroad was quick to throw the engineer under the train, but I thought normally the conductor is the one who is responsible for the safe operation of the train and he/she is the one who would walk the train in the event a train "drops air" due to a brake hose problem or to check cars in the event a defects detector causes a train to be stopped. And, who/what started the fire? Who authorized the fire department (and told them how) to shut down the engine? Why did the railroad not dispatch someone (or contact the nearby off duty engineer) to have them go to the train ASAP and check for problems? Also, I thought that a loss of train air pressure automatically caused the railcar brakes to be applied. You pump air to release the brakes, not to set them. If the train's brake line lost air, why did it roll? There are lot of questions here to be answered.
 
Hi everybody.
Can I first of all express my sincere condolences to the victims, their dependents and friends with regard to all those who have suffered as a result of this terrible tragedy. I would have in my usual manner expressed those regrets much sooner but I have been extremely busy and have not been able to post on the forum in recent weeks.

However, as some forum members may know I am involved in my daily work with industrial safety in the British road transport industry. In that capacity someone in the office yesterday morning (Saturday) mentioned this accident along with the Paris rail crash. It did raise a few questions in our minds which I am hoping those with knowledge of Canadian rail safety and procedure would be able to answer.

It has been stated in this thread that the “loss of air pressure” may have been the cause of the un-manned train rolling away. That said, from the experience we have carrying out investigations regarding air braked vehicles in the road haulage industry, should an unintended loss of air pressure occur the brakes of the vehicle are applied. Therefore the greater the loss of air pressure from the vehicle the more firmly brakes to both trailer and drive unit are enacted. There has been law throughout Europe within the vehicle construction and use regulations for a considerable number of years making the above system mandatory and only vehicles constructed before that regulation was enacted are exempt which thankfully are few and far between now. Would not the same system of brake regulation apply equally in Canada and USA.

It has also been stated that the driver/engineer left the power car with the engine running while he went to a hotel to await the relief driver/engineer to arrive. Certainly within the British transport industry this would be seen as a severe disciplinary offence on behalf of the employee. Not only would this action leave the power car more vulnerable to system failure and therefore fire (as may well have occurred) but also the potential danger of unauthorised persons gaining access to the power car and therefore being able to move the train. Again, would not the same training and disciplinary procedures apply in Canada and the USA.

I am aware as a regular rail passenger that in Britain and throughout Europe trains are left on station platforms with the engine running while the train crew is changed. However this is only for very short periods and when there is normally other station staff in attendance to the train. I do not believe that power cars are left in sidings or maintenance yards with engines running due to the above dangers.

I do not wish to speculate in this posting as to the actual cause of this disaster, as that should be left to the report(s) of the investigation teams. But as stated perhaps those with comprehensive knowledge of the Canadian/ American rail system and procedures could advise us European forum members on the above questions.

Bill
 
I've been thinking about this since the accident happened. A lot of what's been said, particularly in the media, doesn't make sense.

I too have been under the impression that the brakes work in NOT formation, meaning positive air opens them where as no air tightens them. So if the air went out, the train should have locked and stayed in place. Maybe brakes work differently now. I'm not an expert at this. The other thing too, shouldn't the engineer have tied down the train and applied some hand brakes to at least three cars? I've seen this in old training videos on YouTube.

The other thought too is if there was trouble onboard the engine, shouldn't the engineer have stayed around the train even though he outlawed? I mean, that would have been the logical thing to do and put in for overtime later rather than leave something at a risk like this. He could have called the dispatcher and management to let them know he wasn't leaving the train until another crew came up. Just because he outlawed doesn't mean he has to go off duty, particularly when there are issues.

A lot of this accident will be unanswered, publicly, and sadly a lot has to do with common sense on both the engineer's part as well as management. I am of course speculating and assuming here.

John
 
Bill,

Trains in the US are usually left on so they dont have to do what is called a "cold start" of the prime mover. For Amtrak, crew changes on the Michigan Line take only two-three minutes. On freight railroads, it could take longer. Its more of a cost-cutting move, because a cold-start uses more fuel. Its complicated to explain.
 
Hi John, Bluewater and everybody.
This terrible incident caused more conversation in the office this evening with one of our other case handlers doing some investigation from various press reports and with regard to the local fire authority who had attended the scene. That fire department is reporting that they had attended a fire on the same train earlier in the day and dealt with the incident before returning to their station. The report did not say whether that earlier incident was out on the mainline or within the rail complex from which the train eventually did and uncontrolled runaway.

However, believing that the fire department report is correct, this further brings into sharp focus the actions of the train engineer and the management of the company. As the engineer and management must have been aware of the systems failure which initially started the earlier fire, why then did he/they leave the power car engine running and completely abandon the vehicle in such circumstances. Surely to state that he was at the end of his scheduled duty (as the company management have done) quite frankly beggars belief as here was a train with a cargo of crude oil which had a fire emergency earlier in the day being left unattended with all its systems running. If there was ever act of wilful gross negligence then surely this must be it.

With regard to the actions of the fire department on arrival at the train for the second time, no doubt they would have been aware of the trains cargo and therefore extinguishing the fire would have been top priority to stop the risk of the fire spreading to the oil tank cars. As in all cases of fire the first action is to cool the surrounding area of the fire to prevent its spread and deprive the fire of combustible materials which would enable it to continue. An engine with fuel pumps running etc would be a prime source of combustible material and therefore to shut down the engine would be a main priority in the fire department's actions.

It has been stated in this thread by one forum member that the fire department should have contacted the engineer or management of the company before shutting down the engine. That action would certainly not have been the top priority of the fire crew on arrival at the scene. Their first priority as stated would have been to contain and extinguish the fire almost certainly in the belief that the train was secured in its position by the use of a reasonably modern fail safe braking system and the use of car hand brakes especially as there had been a fire and systems failure earlier in the day.

This has been an incident which has probably caused the deaths of over 50 persons. As I stated in my earlier posting in this thread I would not wish to speculate as to the outcome of the current investigations taking place. However, the above would seem to be established facts in this tragedy and therefore one has to wonder whether any company involved in heavy transport should be allowed to continue its operations and that all those involved in this catastrophic incident should not face the full force of court action in the fullness of time.

Bill
 
Bill,
because a cold-start uses more fuel. Its complicated to explain.
That's not it, the 'cold start' is a check list that needs to be run through such as opening all cylinder drain cocks, running the oil pressurize system for a minimum of 30 mins, checking the engine and electrical's looking for possible faults, then turn the engine over a few times with the cocks open, then you close the cocks, it can take 1 hour before you even get the engine started, then you need to run all the brake tests, where I live it takes up to 2 hours per locomotive to run through the check list for main line use, so we leave them on 24/7, setting the isolation switch to the 'start' position puts the engine into 258rpm idle to conserve fuel.

Cheers.
 
That's not it, the 'cold start' is a check list that needs to be run through such as opening all cylinder drain cocks, running the oil pressurize system for a minimum of 30 mins, checking the engine and electrical's looking for possible faults, then turn the engine over a few times with the cocks open, then you close the cocks, it can take 1 hour before you even get the engine started, then you need to run all the brake tests, where I live it takes up to 2 hours per locomotive to run through the check list for main line use, so we leave them on 24/7, setting the isolation switch to the 'start' position puts the engine into 258rpm idle to conserve fuel.

Cheers.
That's what I was attempting to convey.
 
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