jacksonbarno
Alco Spoken Here
So, Trainboi1, Benjaminw, and I have been having some fun deciding how our railroads evolved as the 20th century came to a close, leading into modern day. Pretty random and not really pertaining to much in reality, but we had fun writing this up so hopefully you guys will enjoy it too. This has been a few weeks in the making, and the three of us have been brainstorming and shooting different ideas around to create a pretty cool story. Not sure how many people will be interested, but as said before, we had fun making this, and decided to share it with the rest of you. Hopefully you will find some joy and inspiration from what we've created. We certainly had a blast coming up with a story like this, and at least for me it allowed for some creativity while my computer awaits fixing.
The mega-merger era in the 1970's put several systems on the east coast in a tough position. The formation of the Chessie System, Seaboard Coast Line, and Conrail, among others boxed in roads that once dominated their markets. The Lake Erie & Eastern took action in response as early as 1973, formally leasing the Charleston Asheville & Louisville railroad for 999 years. The CA&L had been indirectly owned by the LE&E since 1932, however until now the LE&E had not influenced the CA&L in any major way. The integration of systems began almost immediately, and in 1978, the formal merger of the two systems became a reality. The Lake Erie & Eastern Corporation was formed that year, taking control of both railroads and all affiliated assets. The LE&E and CA&L were operated under the LE&E name, with CA&L road power being repainted into LE&E paint with small CA&L sublettering under the numbers on the sides of the cab on locomotives. The reason for the odd merger arrangement was simple: CA&L management wanted some form of independence from the new system, and were allowed a limited form of autonomy as a result of being technically a "separate company within a larger company." The shops at Asheville were retained, as well as CA&L operating practices on the new lines. This arrangement lasted through the merger of the LE&E and Ohio River & Western railroads in 1982, however starting in the mid-1980's, LE&E management began increasingly operating the CA&L as another division of the LE&E, rather than a separate integrated subsidiary. To make matters worse, while CA&L officials were interested the preservation of the CA&L’s past, LE&E officials were more concerned with modernization of the new system, which often came at the expense of historical preservation. On the outside, however, the new railroad seemed to work extremely well. Access to new markets allowed the company to more effectively compete with its increasingly large competitors and elimination of redundant trackwork helped to streamline operations. Even through the split of Conrail in 1999, the future seemed bright for the large corporation.
The sudden split of the CA&L and LE&E systems in 2008 came as a big surprise to investors and railroad officials alike. The two roads had been operating as a single coherent system for just over 30 years, and had been successful competing with the larger players in eastern railroading. Even though operationally the two roads were successful, differences in management became apparent as early as 1985, due to the LE&E operating the CA&L as more of an extension of its own lines rather than a separate company. To make matters worse, large stretches of the CA&L were reduced to single track in a system wide rebuilding program that saw materials being shipped up north to help save on the cost of essentially rebuilding the LE&E’s mainlines, most of which had not seen proper maintenance since the late 1960’s. Major downsizing of the steam program in 1995 caused a major rift in company attitudes, as well. The LE&E’s new foray back into the passenger business in the mid-late 1990’s required passenger stock, which it pulled from the excursion pool for rebuilding starting in 1993. By 1998, demand warranted the rebuilding of more equipment, which it took from former CA&L business train pools, which had previously been left intact by LE&E officials. CA&L heads demanded that the LE&E explore the idea of inaugurating a passenger train over CA&L rails instead of creating a second section of the newly re-launched Midnight Limited. The response was essentially “we’ll get back to you on that,” as the Arrow (the second section of the Midnight Limited) was re-inaugurated that year.
An important component of this story revolved around a small, yet well-known Nevada shortline known as the Washoe Valley Railway. Originally a small mining railroad, the WVRR eventually became a small, yet crucial class I starting in the 1910’s, serving as an effective bridge route between the ATSF and Western Pacific, beating shipping times on the “Inside Gateway” lines operated by the WP and ATSF to compete with SP’s California stronghold. The WVRR’s affiliation with the LE&E dated back to 1901, when railroad magnate Robert House attempted to form a transcontinental system. Eventually he came to own the LE&E’s direct ancestor, the Boston Pittsburgh & Western railway, as well as the Ohio River & North Western Railway, and the Washoe Valley Railway among others. However, this transcontinental system was not to be: there was no connection between House’s western holdings and his eastern ones. Attempts to create a transcontinental route proved catastrophic when the OR&NW’s Omaha Extension bankrupted the railroad. The rest of his holdings soon followed, most properties owned in the system were leveraged on debt owned by the other railroads, and the failure of the OR&NW in 1908 caused a domino effect that rippled throughout the system. While the OR&NW and BP&W were reorganized into roads that would eventually become the OR&W and LE&E, the WVRR escaped the mess largely unscathed thanks to a group of Nevada and California investors who held personal interests in the road’s viability. The WVRR would again come into the LE&E’s crosshairs during its expansionary period beginning in the late 1970’s. With the 1982 acquisition of the OR&W, the LE&E began plotting to create the largest single rail system in the country. Stretching from Boston and Jacksonville at its northeastern and southeastern ends, and to Omaha (with an unused trackage rights option to Denver over the UP) at its west end, LE&E management once again began to have dreams of grandeur. The gap was closer now than ever before, and it seemed possible through political scheming to create the system that House had failed to do. In 1982, the LE&E began buying stock in the WVRR again, with plans to gain trackage rights over the D&RGW via the Utah Railway and the states of Colorado and Wyoming in order to further bridge their gap. With the WVRR under their control, this new LE&E system would have firm ground to stand on when making these advances, especially if money changed political hands in the process.
The LE&E’s first attempt to acquire the WVRR was met with congressman from Nevada blocking the attempt, pulling up state regulations from the late 1800’s pertaining to the railroad’s charter, blocking the company from being operated directly by an entity based outside the state of Nevada. Begrudgingly, after three months of fighting the legislation, the LE&E created the Lake Erie Valley Company based out of Reno, Nevada to act as an intermediary for the transaction. Essentially, the holding company would operate the railroad at arm’s length, bypassing the state regulations. However, the three months gave the WVRR time to prepare. The next two years became a battle for control of the small Nevada road, with obscure laws and regulations being pulled up seemingly out of the blue. The LE&E eventually gave up the fight in mid-1985, as the company turned its attention to the massive rebuilding program it was undertaking of its own lines.
The second attempt of the LE&E to take over the WVRR began two years later in 1987, when the Lake Erie Valley Company began buying stock in the WVRR once more. The LE&E’s lawyers had prepared over the past two years and cut through the regulation quickly enough to facilitate purchase of stock, however the WVRR began fighting back by forming a coalition of investors to drive up the price. By 1990, the LE&E owned 40% of the WVRR, and was on the verge of a takeover. However, in May of that year, the WVRR board, still majority independent, voted to take the WVRR off of the stock market and into private hands, acting on a provision in the railroad’s charter allowing it to do so every 50 years. The coalition of investors bankrolled the transition, and the LE&E received over 3 million for its share of the stock. This time, the LE&E finally accepted defeat, spinning off the ex-OR&W’s western extensions and concentrating on its extensive network east of the Mississippi.
The mega-merger era in the 1970's put several systems on the east coast in a tough position. The formation of the Chessie System, Seaboard Coast Line, and Conrail, among others boxed in roads that once dominated their markets. The Lake Erie & Eastern took action in response as early as 1973, formally leasing the Charleston Asheville & Louisville railroad for 999 years. The CA&L had been indirectly owned by the LE&E since 1932, however until now the LE&E had not influenced the CA&L in any major way. The integration of systems began almost immediately, and in 1978, the formal merger of the two systems became a reality. The Lake Erie & Eastern Corporation was formed that year, taking control of both railroads and all affiliated assets. The LE&E and CA&L were operated under the LE&E name, with CA&L road power being repainted into LE&E paint with small CA&L sublettering under the numbers on the sides of the cab on locomotives. The reason for the odd merger arrangement was simple: CA&L management wanted some form of independence from the new system, and were allowed a limited form of autonomy as a result of being technically a "separate company within a larger company." The shops at Asheville were retained, as well as CA&L operating practices on the new lines. This arrangement lasted through the merger of the LE&E and Ohio River & Western railroads in 1982, however starting in the mid-1980's, LE&E management began increasingly operating the CA&L as another division of the LE&E, rather than a separate integrated subsidiary. To make matters worse, while CA&L officials were interested the preservation of the CA&L’s past, LE&E officials were more concerned with modernization of the new system, which often came at the expense of historical preservation. On the outside, however, the new railroad seemed to work extremely well. Access to new markets allowed the company to more effectively compete with its increasingly large competitors and elimination of redundant trackwork helped to streamline operations. Even through the split of Conrail in 1999, the future seemed bright for the large corporation.
The sudden split of the CA&L and LE&E systems in 2008 came as a big surprise to investors and railroad officials alike. The two roads had been operating as a single coherent system for just over 30 years, and had been successful competing with the larger players in eastern railroading. Even though operationally the two roads were successful, differences in management became apparent as early as 1985, due to the LE&E operating the CA&L as more of an extension of its own lines rather than a separate company. To make matters worse, large stretches of the CA&L were reduced to single track in a system wide rebuilding program that saw materials being shipped up north to help save on the cost of essentially rebuilding the LE&E’s mainlines, most of which had not seen proper maintenance since the late 1960’s. Major downsizing of the steam program in 1995 caused a major rift in company attitudes, as well. The LE&E’s new foray back into the passenger business in the mid-late 1990’s required passenger stock, which it pulled from the excursion pool for rebuilding starting in 1993. By 1998, demand warranted the rebuilding of more equipment, which it took from former CA&L business train pools, which had previously been left intact by LE&E officials. CA&L heads demanded that the LE&E explore the idea of inaugurating a passenger train over CA&L rails instead of creating a second section of the newly re-launched Midnight Limited. The response was essentially “we’ll get back to you on that,” as the Arrow (the second section of the Midnight Limited) was re-inaugurated that year.
An important component of this story revolved around a small, yet well-known Nevada shortline known as the Washoe Valley Railway. Originally a small mining railroad, the WVRR eventually became a small, yet crucial class I starting in the 1910’s, serving as an effective bridge route between the ATSF and Western Pacific, beating shipping times on the “Inside Gateway” lines operated by the WP and ATSF to compete with SP’s California stronghold. The WVRR’s affiliation with the LE&E dated back to 1901, when railroad magnate Robert House attempted to form a transcontinental system. Eventually he came to own the LE&E’s direct ancestor, the Boston Pittsburgh & Western railway, as well as the Ohio River & North Western Railway, and the Washoe Valley Railway among others. However, this transcontinental system was not to be: there was no connection between House’s western holdings and his eastern ones. Attempts to create a transcontinental route proved catastrophic when the OR&NW’s Omaha Extension bankrupted the railroad. The rest of his holdings soon followed, most properties owned in the system were leveraged on debt owned by the other railroads, and the failure of the OR&NW in 1908 caused a domino effect that rippled throughout the system. While the OR&NW and BP&W were reorganized into roads that would eventually become the OR&W and LE&E, the WVRR escaped the mess largely unscathed thanks to a group of Nevada and California investors who held personal interests in the road’s viability. The WVRR would again come into the LE&E’s crosshairs during its expansionary period beginning in the late 1970’s. With the 1982 acquisition of the OR&W, the LE&E began plotting to create the largest single rail system in the country. Stretching from Boston and Jacksonville at its northeastern and southeastern ends, and to Omaha (with an unused trackage rights option to Denver over the UP) at its west end, LE&E management once again began to have dreams of grandeur. The gap was closer now than ever before, and it seemed possible through political scheming to create the system that House had failed to do. In 1982, the LE&E began buying stock in the WVRR again, with plans to gain trackage rights over the D&RGW via the Utah Railway and the states of Colorado and Wyoming in order to further bridge their gap. With the WVRR under their control, this new LE&E system would have firm ground to stand on when making these advances, especially if money changed political hands in the process.
The LE&E’s first attempt to acquire the WVRR was met with congressman from Nevada blocking the attempt, pulling up state regulations from the late 1800’s pertaining to the railroad’s charter, blocking the company from being operated directly by an entity based outside the state of Nevada. Begrudgingly, after three months of fighting the legislation, the LE&E created the Lake Erie Valley Company based out of Reno, Nevada to act as an intermediary for the transaction. Essentially, the holding company would operate the railroad at arm’s length, bypassing the state regulations. However, the three months gave the WVRR time to prepare. The next two years became a battle for control of the small Nevada road, with obscure laws and regulations being pulled up seemingly out of the blue. The LE&E eventually gave up the fight in mid-1985, as the company turned its attention to the massive rebuilding program it was undertaking of its own lines.
The second attempt of the LE&E to take over the WVRR began two years later in 1987, when the Lake Erie Valley Company began buying stock in the WVRR once more. The LE&E’s lawyers had prepared over the past two years and cut through the regulation quickly enough to facilitate purchase of stock, however the WVRR began fighting back by forming a coalition of investors to drive up the price. By 1990, the LE&E owned 40% of the WVRR, and was on the verge of a takeover. However, in May of that year, the WVRR board, still majority independent, voted to take the WVRR off of the stock market and into private hands, acting on a provision in the railroad’s charter allowing it to do so every 50 years. The coalition of investors bankrolled the transition, and the LE&E received over 3 million for its share of the stock. This time, the LE&E finally accepted defeat, spinning off the ex-OR&W’s western extensions and concentrating on its extensive network east of the Mississippi.
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