Perhaps the mile long oil trains are here to stay:
http://www.npr.org/2013/10/28/24138...to-transport-crude-oil-in-the-u-s?ft=1&f=1001
http://www.npr.org/2013/10/28/24138...to-transport-crude-oil-in-the-u-s?ft=1&f=1001
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Rail Gets Boost From USA Oil Production
- Thread starter boleyd
- Start date
cascaderailroad
New member
There's a lot more dangerous cargo (gas's / chemicals) than crude oil, traveling down the rails, right in your backyard, now ! Ever read the stensils and placards ?
cascaderailroad
New member
It does ... at 70mph, when dozens, and dozens, of loaded tankcars derail and accordian catastrophicly into a twisted tightly balled up mass, and come bashing though peoples kitchens and living rooms, tearing down electrical lines, with sparks and fires all over the tracks ties, and exploding buildings with ruptured natural gas pipelines.
See: https://www.google.com/search?q=can...chief-alleges-train-was-tampered-with;600;450
See: https://www.google.com/search?q=can...chief-alleges-train-was-tampered-with;600;450
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The thing about the wreck in Canada is that crude is not supposed to act as it did, it is not supposed to explode under those conditions.
John
According to some investigations this was not just crude oil but some other combination of petro chemicals and the freight cars were rated marked improperly by the shipper (probably to avoid the duties and taxes on the high risk shipment).
John
Hi John and Everybody.
John, the train was in fact carrying Bakken light crude oil which is of similar chemical composition to British light Brent crude. This type of oil is as combustible as gasoline under certain conditions and has to be graded and labelled when in transport with markings and handling standards far higher than normal with Gulf crude oil. Unfortunately this train was not.
The problem with Bakken crude is that it contains hydrogen sulphide which has a very low flashpoint and when being transported these gas molecules can rise to the top of the crude oil, combine and become a highly hazardous concentration whether that is in a pipeline or rail/road tanker. The hazards with hydrogen sulphide are not just its low flashpoint dangers. Anyone breathing in the toxin/gas will immediately have problems of breathing, dizziness and nausea which can be life-threatening at that time. However, hydrogen sulphide also has very long term effects in that the human body cannot completely expunge the toxin from its system. Not only will anyone contaminated have long-term chronic symptoms and sickness from the contamination throughout their lifetime but the toxin can also be passed from generation to generation through a victim’s offspring. Therefore all those near the scene of the accident in Lac-Mégantic may live with the consequences of the tragedy for several generations to come.
I see that the chairman of the now defunct railway company has withdrawn his allegations that the fire services were responsible for the accident. He now acknowledges that the locomotive had a damaged piston which caused it to smoke heavily and shower sparks and ignited oil backwards over the freightcars while it was in transit . He now advises that the engine should have been shut down much earlier in the day when that was first noticed.
In my view, all those responsible for this catastrophe should be locked up and the key thrown away, as the key to a normal life has been thrown away by the victims in this tragedy both deceased and living
Bill
According to some investigations this was not just crude oil but some other combination of petro chemicals and the freight cars were rated marked improperly by the shipper (probably to avoid the duties and taxes on the high risk shipment).
John
John, the train was in fact carrying Bakken light crude oil which is of similar chemical composition to British light Brent crude. This type of oil is as combustible as gasoline under certain conditions and has to be graded and labelled when in transport with markings and handling standards far higher than normal with Gulf crude oil. Unfortunately this train was not.
The problem with Bakken crude is that it contains hydrogen sulphide which has a very low flashpoint and when being transported these gas molecules can rise to the top of the crude oil, combine and become a highly hazardous concentration whether that is in a pipeline or rail/road tanker. The hazards with hydrogen sulphide are not just its low flashpoint dangers. Anyone breathing in the toxin/gas will immediately have problems of breathing, dizziness and nausea which can be life-threatening at that time. However, hydrogen sulphide also has very long term effects in that the human body cannot completely expunge the toxin from its system. Not only will anyone contaminated have long-term chronic symptoms and sickness from the contamination throughout their lifetime but the toxin can also be passed from generation to generation through a victim’s offspring. Therefore all those near the scene of the accident in Lac-Mégantic may live with the consequences of the tragedy for several generations to come.
I see that the chairman of the now defunct railway company has withdrawn his allegations that the fire services were responsible for the accident. He now acknowledges that the locomotive had a damaged piston which caused it to smoke heavily and shower sparks and ignited oil backwards over the freightcars while it was in transit . He now advises that the engine should have been shut down much earlier in the day when that was first noticed.
In my view, all those responsible for this catastrophe should be locked up and the key thrown away, as the key to a normal life has been thrown away by the victims in this tragedy both deceased and living
Bill
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cascaderailroad
New member
This is news to me ... as I heard the locos remained at the top of the grade ... and the severed, unignited, consist rolled downhill, without engines attached, and the consist was not on fire, and was not a rolling inferno ... and the ignition point only occured as the dozens and dozens of speeding runaway unignited tank cars piled up on one another, into a twisted mass, and then burst into flames, as a result of the concussion of metal on metal causing sparks.snip~ the chairman of the now defunct railway company has withdrawn his allegations that the fire services were responsible for the accident. He now acknowledges that the locomotive had a damaged piston which caused it to smoke heavily and shower sparks and ignited oil backwards over the freightcars while it was in transit
Bill
I can see the story changing, and more baloney (lies) are being fed to the press, and the great cover-up continues to be fabricated !
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Hi everyone.
Cascade, once again I do not know where you get your information from, for according to several leading industrial safety journals printed worldwide the power cars went down the gradient at the front of the freight cars and were found at some distance from the scene of the tragedy further down the line. They had obviously broken away by way of the couplings fracturing at the time of the derailment. I also did not state that the train was on fire prior to the accident .The fire could have been caused by any number reasons at the time of the derailment.
No one is lying about this tragedy but there are some that will not recognise the facts, negligence and truth of what happened.
Bill
Cascade, once again I do not know where you get your information from, for according to several leading industrial safety journals printed worldwide the power cars went down the gradient at the front of the freight cars and were found at some distance from the scene of the tragedy further down the line. They had obviously broken away by way of the couplings fracturing at the time of the derailment. I also did not state that the train was on fire prior to the accident .The fire could have been caused by any number reasons at the time of the derailment.
No one is lying about this tragedy but there are some that will not recognise the facts, negligence and truth of what happened.
Bill
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Hi John and everybody.
Bakken crude is not “sweet” due to the presence of hydrogen sulphide and benzene in comparatively high levels. Following is a Hazards identification sheet I drew down from our company files today.
1)PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION
LIGHT CRUDE OIL
Synonyms: Bakken Oil, Bakken Crude
Chemical Description: A naturally occurring mixture of aromatic hydrocarbons and percentage amounts of sulfur and nitrogen compounds
2) COMPOSITION/INFORMATION ON INGREDIENTS
Petroleum Crude Oil, Benzene, Hydrogen Sulfide in liquid and vapour: vapour phase may contain high concentrations.
3. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
Routes of Entry: Skin contact, skin absorption, eye contact, inhalation, ingestion
Emergency Overview: Warning. Flammable liquid and vapour. Liquid and vapour may cause irritation or burns to eyes, nose and throat. Inhalation of vapour may cause dizziness and drowsiness. Possible cancer hazard (benzene). Possible asphyxiation hazard (hydrogen sulfide). Wear personal protective equipment appropriate for the task.
Potential Health Effects: Contains material which may cause cancer after protracted skin contact.
4. FIRST AID MEASURES
Eye Contact: Immediately flush eyes with large amounts of lukewarm water for 15 minutes, lifting upperand lower lids at intervals. Seek medical attention if irritation persists.
Skin Contact:
Remove contaminated clothing. Flush skin with water. Get medical attention if irritation
persists or large area of contact. Decontaminate clothing before re-use.
Inhalation: (if hydrogen sulphide suspected)
Ensure own safety. Remove victim to fresh air. Give oxygen, artificial respiration, or CPR if needed. Seek medical attention immediately.
5. FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES
Flammable: Material will ignite at normal temperatures.
Means of Extinction: Foam, carbon dioxide (CO2), dry chemical. Explosive accumulations can build up in areas of poor ventilation.
Special Procedures: Use water spray to cool fire-exposed containers, and to disperse vapors. if spill has not ignited. Cut off fuel and allow flame to burn out.
Sensitivity to Impact: No
Sensitivity to Static Discharge: Yes, at normal temperatures
Hazardous Combustion Products: Carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, smoke particles
6. ACIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES
Personnel precautions: Appropriately trained personnel should respond to uncontrolled releases. Avoid direct contact with material; use the personal protective equipment specified. Stay upwind of release; isolate the immediate hazard area; and keep unnecessary and unprotected people away. Use water spray to cool containers. Eliminate all sources of ignition. Provide explosion-proof clearing ventilation, if possible.
7. HANDLING AND STORAGE
Caution: Hydrogen sulfide may accumulate in headspaces of tanks and other equipment, even when concentrations in the liquid product are low. Factors increasing this hazard potential include heating,
agitation Assess the exposure risk by gas monitoring. Wear air supplying breathing apparatus if necessary. Overexposure to hydrogen sulfide may cause dizziness, headache, nausea and possibly unconsciousness and death.
11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION
Acute Exposure
Vapour may cause irritation of eyes, nose and throat, dizziness and drowsiness. Contact with skin may cause irritation and possibly dermatitis. Contact of liquid with eyes may cause severe irritation or
burns.
Chronic Exposure
Due to presence of benzene, long term exposure may increase the risk of anemia and leukemia. Repeated skin contact may increase the risk of skin cancer.
Irritant: Yes Skin Sensitization: Yes Respiratory Sensitization: No
Carcinogenicity: Yes Reproductive Toxicity Probably Teratogenicity: Probably
Hydrogen Sulfide
Hydrogen sulfide is considered to be mutagenic or a reproductive and developmental toxicant.
Hydrogen sulfide is not listed as a carcinogen.
14. TRANSPORT INFORMATION
Canadian Classification
This product has been classified in accordance with the hazard criteria of the Controlled Products Regulation (CPR) and the MSDS contains all of the information required by the CPR.
WHMIS Classification: B2 – Flammable and combustible material – Flammable liquid
D2A – Poisonous and infectious material – Other effects – Very toxic
D2B – Poisonous and infectious material – Other effects – Toxic
Hydrogen Sulfide – Fire, Immediate (Acute),
Produced Hydrocarbons – Fire, Sudden Release of Pressure, Immediate (Acute), Delayed (Chronic).
United States National Chemical Inventory:
California 65: This product contains benzene a chemical known to the State of California to cause cancer and developmental harm.
Bill
Bakken crude is not “sweet” due to the presence of hydrogen sulphide and benzene in comparatively high levels. Following is a Hazards identification sheet I drew down from our company files today.
1)PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION
LIGHT CRUDE OIL
Synonyms: Bakken Oil, Bakken Crude
Chemical Description: A naturally occurring mixture of aromatic hydrocarbons and percentage amounts of sulfur and nitrogen compounds
2) COMPOSITION/INFORMATION ON INGREDIENTS
Petroleum Crude Oil, Benzene, Hydrogen Sulfide in liquid and vapour: vapour phase may contain high concentrations.
3. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION
Routes of Entry: Skin contact, skin absorption, eye contact, inhalation, ingestion
Emergency Overview: Warning. Flammable liquid and vapour. Liquid and vapour may cause irritation or burns to eyes, nose and throat. Inhalation of vapour may cause dizziness and drowsiness. Possible cancer hazard (benzene). Possible asphyxiation hazard (hydrogen sulfide). Wear personal protective equipment appropriate for the task.
Potential Health Effects: Contains material which may cause cancer after protracted skin contact.
4. FIRST AID MEASURES
Eye Contact: Immediately flush eyes with large amounts of lukewarm water for 15 minutes, lifting upperand lower lids at intervals. Seek medical attention if irritation persists.
Skin Contact:
Remove contaminated clothing. Flush skin with water. Get medical attention if irritation
persists or large area of contact. Decontaminate clothing before re-use.
Inhalation: (if hydrogen sulphide suspected)
Ensure own safety. Remove victim to fresh air. Give oxygen, artificial respiration, or CPR if needed. Seek medical attention immediately.
5. FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES
Flammable: Material will ignite at normal temperatures.
Means of Extinction: Foam, carbon dioxide (CO2), dry chemical. Explosive accumulations can build up in areas of poor ventilation.
Special Procedures: Use water spray to cool fire-exposed containers, and to disperse vapors. if spill has not ignited. Cut off fuel and allow flame to burn out.
Sensitivity to Impact: No
Sensitivity to Static Discharge: Yes, at normal temperatures
Hazardous Combustion Products: Carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, smoke particles
6. ACIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES
Personnel precautions: Appropriately trained personnel should respond to uncontrolled releases. Avoid direct contact with material; use the personal protective equipment specified. Stay upwind of release; isolate the immediate hazard area; and keep unnecessary and unprotected people away. Use water spray to cool containers. Eliminate all sources of ignition. Provide explosion-proof clearing ventilation, if possible.
7. HANDLING AND STORAGE
Caution: Hydrogen sulfide may accumulate in headspaces of tanks and other equipment, even when concentrations in the liquid product are low. Factors increasing this hazard potential include heating,
agitation Assess the exposure risk by gas monitoring. Wear air supplying breathing apparatus if necessary. Overexposure to hydrogen sulfide may cause dizziness, headache, nausea and possibly unconsciousness and death.
11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION
Acute Exposure
Vapour may cause irritation of eyes, nose and throat, dizziness and drowsiness. Contact with skin may cause irritation and possibly dermatitis. Contact of liquid with eyes may cause severe irritation or
burns.
Chronic Exposure
Due to presence of benzene, long term exposure may increase the risk of anemia and leukemia. Repeated skin contact may increase the risk of skin cancer.
Irritant: Yes Skin Sensitization: Yes Respiratory Sensitization: No
Carcinogenicity: Yes Reproductive Toxicity Probably Teratogenicity: Probably
Hydrogen Sulfide
Hydrogen sulfide is considered to be mutagenic or a reproductive and developmental toxicant.
Hydrogen sulfide is not listed as a carcinogen.
14. TRANSPORT INFORMATION
Canadian Classification
This product has been classified in accordance with the hazard criteria of the Controlled Products Regulation (CPR) and the MSDS contains all of the information required by the CPR.
WHMIS Classification: B2 – Flammable and combustible material – Flammable liquid
D2A – Poisonous and infectious material – Other effects – Very toxic
D2B – Poisonous and infectious material – Other effects – Toxic
Hydrogen Sulfide – Fire, Immediate (Acute),
Produced Hydrocarbons – Fire, Sudden Release of Pressure, Immediate (Acute), Delayed (Chronic).
United States National Chemical Inventory:
California 65: This product contains benzene a chemical known to the State of California to cause cancer and developmental harm.
Bill
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[h=1]Sweet vs Sour Crude Oil[/h] Sweet crude oil is considered “sweet” if it contains less than 0.5% sulfur. In comparison, sour crude oil contains impurity sulfur levels larger than 0.5%.
Sweet crude oil contains small amounts of hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide and it is commonly used for processing into gasoline, kerosene, and high-quality diesel. Before sour crude oil can be refined into gasoline, impurities need to be removed, therefore increasing the cost of processing. This results in a higher-priced gasoline than that made from sweet crude oil. For this reason sour crude is usually processed into heavy oil such as diesel and fuel oil rather than gasoline to reduce processing costs.
The sweet light crude oil Western Texas Intermediate (WTI) is used as a benchmark in oil pricing. Bakken Crude is classified as WTI, thus "sweet" Below is a MSD for Baken Crude
http://www.cenovus.com/contractor/docs/CenovusMSDS_BakkenOil.pdf
John
Sweet crude oil contains small amounts of hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide and it is commonly used for processing into gasoline, kerosene, and high-quality diesel. Before sour crude oil can be refined into gasoline, impurities need to be removed, therefore increasing the cost of processing. This results in a higher-priced gasoline than that made from sweet crude oil. For this reason sour crude is usually processed into heavy oil such as diesel and fuel oil rather than gasoline to reduce processing costs.
The sweet light crude oil Western Texas Intermediate (WTI) is used as a benchmark in oil pricing. Bakken Crude is classified as WTI, thus "sweet" Below is a MSD for Baken Crude
http://www.cenovus.com/contractor/docs/CenovusMSDS_BakkenOil.pdf
John
Hi John and Everybody.
John, the train was in fact carrying Bakken light crude oil which is of similar chemical composition to British light Brent crude. This type of oil is as combustible as gasoline under certain conditions and has to be graded and labelled when in transport with markings and handling standards far higher than normal with Gulf crude oil. Unfortunately this train was not.
The problem with Bakken crude is that it contains hydrogen sulphide which has a very low flashpoint and when being transported these gas molecules can rise to the top of the crude oil, combine and become a highly hazardous concentration whether that is in a pipeline or rail/road tanker. The hazards with hydrogen sulphide are not just its low flashpoint dangers. Anyone breathing in the toxin/gas will immediately have problems of breathing, dizziness and nausea which can be life-threatening at that time. However, hydrogen sulphide also has very long term effects in that the human body cannot completely expunge the toxin from its system. Not only will anyone contaminated have long-term chronic symptoms and sickness from the contamination throughout their lifetime but the toxin can also be passed from generation to generation through a victim’s offspring. Therefore all those near the scene of the accident in Lac-Mégantic may live with the consequences of the tragedy for several generations to come.
I see that the chairman of the now defunct railway company has withdrawn his allegations that the fire services were responsible for the accident. He now acknowledges that the locomotive had a damaged piston which caused it to smoke heavily and shower sparks and ignited oil backwards over the freightcars while it was in transit . He now advises that the engine should have been shut down much earlier in the day when that was first noticed.
In my view, all those responsible for this catastrophe should be locked up and the key thrown away, as the key to a normal life has been thrown away by the victims in this tragedy both deceased and living
Bill
Bill,
Thank you for that information. The shipper is currently under investigation due to mismarking their shipment. If they had marked the railcars with what they were supposed to contain, then they probably would have been treated differently. What you have pointed out makes sense, especially from the MSD sheet info you posted.
http://news.softpedia.com/news/Oil-...in-Crash-May-Have-Caused-Tragedy-382363.shtml
Knowing how companies try to save a buck here and there, I wouldn't doubt this in the least bit. I dealt with a customer in Mexico that wanted us to change customs documents to reflect an improper commodity code for a particular product. I refused to do so because I would be held responsible and could face jail time if I did that in addition to a major fine which would have been levied against me and not the companies.
John
[h=1]TSB Canada: Lac Mégantic crude more hazardous[/h]By Steve Sweeney
Published: September 11, 2013
OTTAWA, Ontario – Canadian rail investigators say tests confirm crude oil involved in the Lac Mégantic crash behaved more like gasoline than expected.
In a mid-morning news conference, Transportation Safety Board of Canada investigators told the news media that samples they took from the tank car train involved in the July 6 crash in Lac Mégantic, Quebec, and one train behind it, had lower flash points, making the oil more dangerous than it was described in shipping documents.
Don Ross, the lead English-speaking transport agency investigator, says the crude oil in the trains was described as Packing Group III, which includes diesel fuel and “bunker-type, thick, gooey oils.”
Instead, Ross says, crude oil in the trains tested would be more appropriately described as Packing Group II liquids, that include varieties of gasoline and kerosene. Ross says the finding are limited to the two trains tested, and that the Transportation Safety Board cannot comment on whether the shipments are representative of other crude oil trains.
As a result of the findings, Ross says his agency sent a letter to Transport Canada and to the U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration asking the regulators “to review the processes for suppliers and companies transporting or importing dangerous goods to ensure the properties of the goods are accurately determined and documented for safe transportation.”
In back-and-forth questioning in French and English, Ross, the media, and a French-speaking investigator discussed documentation for the shipments of crude oil from wells in North Dakota to point the oil was loaded into tank cars.
Ross says oil suppliers described the crude sent to trucking companies and railroads as “Group II,” but by the time the oils were mixed and blended into tank cars, it was described as the less hazardous “Group III.” Ross says he has not found the reason for the change in descriptions.
Ross also says it is his understanding that the oil buyer, or consignee, is responsible for appropriate description of the goods when the end destination is in Canada. The buyer for the crude on the Lac Mégantic train was Saint John, New Brunswick-based Irving Oil that has a refinery in Saint John.
Ross says the transport agency’s investigation continues and that he is unwilling to say if correct descriptions on crude oil would have affected fire-fighting efforts in Lac Mégantic, or if the railroads involved, Canadian Pacific and the Montreal, Maine & Atlantic would have packaged or handled the oil differently.
On July 6, a 76-car train carrying crude oil from the Bakken region of North Dakota uncontrollably rolled into Lac Mégantic, Quebec, derailing and sparking a blaze that leveled much of the town’s center and killed 46 people. Investigators say the fact that the crude oil was more hazardous than its description explains why the train caught fire so quickly when the DOT111 tank cars carrying the crude oil ruptured upon derailing from the tracks.
Published: September 11, 2013
OTTAWA, Ontario – Canadian rail investigators say tests confirm crude oil involved in the Lac Mégantic crash behaved more like gasoline than expected.
In a mid-morning news conference, Transportation Safety Board of Canada investigators told the news media that samples they took from the tank car train involved in the July 6 crash in Lac Mégantic, Quebec, and one train behind it, had lower flash points, making the oil more dangerous than it was described in shipping documents.
Don Ross, the lead English-speaking transport agency investigator, says the crude oil in the trains was described as Packing Group III, which includes diesel fuel and “bunker-type, thick, gooey oils.”
Instead, Ross says, crude oil in the trains tested would be more appropriately described as Packing Group II liquids, that include varieties of gasoline and kerosene. Ross says the finding are limited to the two trains tested, and that the Transportation Safety Board cannot comment on whether the shipments are representative of other crude oil trains.
As a result of the findings, Ross says his agency sent a letter to Transport Canada and to the U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration asking the regulators “to review the processes for suppliers and companies transporting or importing dangerous goods to ensure the properties of the goods are accurately determined and documented for safe transportation.”
In back-and-forth questioning in French and English, Ross, the media, and a French-speaking investigator discussed documentation for the shipments of crude oil from wells in North Dakota to point the oil was loaded into tank cars.
Ross says oil suppliers described the crude sent to trucking companies and railroads as “Group II,” but by the time the oils were mixed and blended into tank cars, it was described as the less hazardous “Group III.” Ross says he has not found the reason for the change in descriptions.
Ross also says it is his understanding that the oil buyer, or consignee, is responsible for appropriate description of the goods when the end destination is in Canada. The buyer for the crude on the Lac Mégantic train was Saint John, New Brunswick-based Irving Oil that has a refinery in Saint John.
Ross says the transport agency’s investigation continues and that he is unwilling to say if correct descriptions on crude oil would have affected fire-fighting efforts in Lac Mégantic, or if the railroads involved, Canadian Pacific and the Montreal, Maine & Atlantic would have packaged or handled the oil differently.
On July 6, a 76-car train carrying crude oil from the Bakken region of North Dakota uncontrollably rolled into Lac Mégantic, Quebec, derailing and sparking a blaze that leveled much of the town’s center and killed 46 people. Investigators say the fact that the crude oil was more hazardous than its description explains why the train caught fire so quickly when the DOT111 tank cars carrying the crude oil ruptured upon derailing from the tracks.
Hi, John, johnnyC1 and everybody.
I would agree with johnnyC1 that sweet crude is generally identified to have a lower hydrogen sulphide than other designated crude oils although there are now some concerns that the chemical reaction between the rocks, the extraction materials and pressures used in the fracking creates variable levels of hydrogen sulphide in the extracted crude oil almost on a day to day basis which can be at the same extraction site. For this reason the British health and safety executive have requested the government to raise the hazard rating for this crude when both static and in transportation.
That said, even if you accept the current industry composition standards the big problem you have in assessing the risk hazards of any crude oil due for transportation is that the very act of transporting the liquid can change the chemical composition of the oil. An assessment is always drawn up on three elements, molecular composition, density/specific gravity (at an ambient temperature) and agitation.
The first two of the above elements are considered relative constants although gravity can change somewhat through varying air temperatures in transportation. The big variable is the agitation of the oil while in movement. The foregoing will cause the highly flammable and toxic vapours then given off by the agitated hydrogen sulphide to rise through the liquid and collect above the top of the crude oil changing the hazard composition from what many would consider to be a relatively inert liquid material prior to transportation, into to a highly inflammable and toxic composition while being transported.
Obviously the density/gravity of the oil will affect the speed that the molecular changes to the oil occur. However, with light crude even though hydrogen sulphide may be at a lower levels (parts per million) following extraction, the lower density will allow more of the vapour by percentage to move and collect above the top of liquid during transport. This will increase the hazard risk and consequently lifting the endangerment of those persons in the vicinity of the transportation.
The above is in my view is why the Canadian and US railroad industry must look quickly and very closely at the handling and hazard labelling of crude oil especially when the extraction has been carried out by the relatively new method of fracking
Bill
I would agree with johnnyC1 that sweet crude is generally identified to have a lower hydrogen sulphide than other designated crude oils although there are now some concerns that the chemical reaction between the rocks, the extraction materials and pressures used in the fracking creates variable levels of hydrogen sulphide in the extracted crude oil almost on a day to day basis which can be at the same extraction site. For this reason the British health and safety executive have requested the government to raise the hazard rating for this crude when both static and in transportation.
That said, even if you accept the current industry composition standards the big problem you have in assessing the risk hazards of any crude oil due for transportation is that the very act of transporting the liquid can change the chemical composition of the oil. An assessment is always drawn up on three elements, molecular composition, density/specific gravity (at an ambient temperature) and agitation.
The first two of the above elements are considered relative constants although gravity can change somewhat through varying air temperatures in transportation. The big variable is the agitation of the oil while in movement. The foregoing will cause the highly flammable and toxic vapours then given off by the agitated hydrogen sulphide to rise through the liquid and collect above the top of the crude oil changing the hazard composition from what many would consider to be a relatively inert liquid material prior to transportation, into to a highly inflammable and toxic composition while being transported.
Obviously the density/gravity of the oil will affect the speed that the molecular changes to the oil occur. However, with light crude even though hydrogen sulphide may be at a lower levels (parts per million) following extraction, the lower density will allow more of the vapour by percentage to move and collect above the top of liquid during transport. This will increase the hazard risk and consequently lifting the endangerment of those persons in the vicinity of the transportation.
The above is in my view is why the Canadian and US railroad industry must look quickly and very closely at the handling and hazard labelling of crude oil especially when the extraction has been carried out by the relatively new method of fracking
Bill
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Crude oil has been transported by rail for at least 100 yrs., and I don't see why it's such a big deal to figure out what happened. The train derailed at a speed of 45mph on rails where there was a 10mph & 25mph speed restriction through curves, going down a grade of a least 1.3%. When the crude was expelled from the ruptured tank cars some of it vaporized and found an ignition source, which there were many. Do the math! No rocket science involved!
John
John
Hi JohnnyC1 and everybody.
JohnnyC1, with regard to your comment “do the maths” that is exactly what the accident investigation team will be doing in attempting to find out exactly what happened prior to the derailment, at the moment of the derailment, the combustible materials that enabled the explosive type fire to ignite and the source of ignition for that fire. You are right also that it is not “rocket science” to find out the true cause of the tragedy. It is takes however many many hours of relentless thorough investigation the object of which is to stem the likelihood of a similar incident occurring in the future
The preliminary investigation has already found the primary cause of the derailment in that there was a failure of the train primary and backup braking and holding systems which allowed an uncontrolled runaway of the train. The in-depth investigation now taking place will no doubt have as one of its priorities how that condition came about, who was responsible for that occurrence, the reasons why that person(s) acted as he/they did and whether a recommendation should be put forward for criminal proceedings to be taken against any person(s)
The in-depth investigation team will also have as one of its top priorities finding out how and why the fire took hold so quickly and in such a manner that people did not have the time or were incapable of escaping injury or death. Each casualty has to be investigated both separately and as part of the overall investigation so that the injured and insurers who are involved in liability are made fully aware all circumstances. Along with the foregoing the relatives and dependents of the deceased must also have a full account of how and why the incident occurred, an accurate minute by minute timeline of events and exactly what happened and why to each individual involved in the accident. All the foregoing will make up the basis of the untold number of claims that will be processed through the insurance companies and courts in the coming months and years.
Yes, johnnyC1 the investigators will definitely be “doing their maths” by way of generating numerous numerical risk assessments and reviewing risk assessments that had been produced prior to the accident for inaccuracies that may have played a part in the incident. As stated all the foregoing can take many months of dogged investigation often by way of interviewing those who witnessed and were involved in the tragedy who all too often become very distressed when asked to recall what happened on that day. Yes again johnnyC1 it’s not “rocket science” it is many long hours of hard work in often distressing circumstances for the investigation team themselves, which I can assure anyone is the case from my own experiences.
However, in the end the investigators can have the satisfaction of knowing that those damaged through injury or by way of the property they own will be compensated so far as is possible. That said, the main satisfaction for the investigators is always at the conclusion of the investigation, when they may feel that they have found out the root causes of the accident and brought into place circumstances and procedures that will ensure as far as reasonably possible that a similar accident bringing tragedy and death to so many will not occur again.
Bill
JohnnyC1, with regard to your comment “do the maths” that is exactly what the accident investigation team will be doing in attempting to find out exactly what happened prior to the derailment, at the moment of the derailment, the combustible materials that enabled the explosive type fire to ignite and the source of ignition for that fire. You are right also that it is not “rocket science” to find out the true cause of the tragedy. It is takes however many many hours of relentless thorough investigation the object of which is to stem the likelihood of a similar incident occurring in the future
The preliminary investigation has already found the primary cause of the derailment in that there was a failure of the train primary and backup braking and holding systems which allowed an uncontrolled runaway of the train. The in-depth investigation now taking place will no doubt have as one of its priorities how that condition came about, who was responsible for that occurrence, the reasons why that person(s) acted as he/they did and whether a recommendation should be put forward for criminal proceedings to be taken against any person(s)
The in-depth investigation team will also have as one of its top priorities finding out how and why the fire took hold so quickly and in such a manner that people did not have the time or were incapable of escaping injury or death. Each casualty has to be investigated both separately and as part of the overall investigation so that the injured and insurers who are involved in liability are made fully aware all circumstances. Along with the foregoing the relatives and dependents of the deceased must also have a full account of how and why the incident occurred, an accurate minute by minute timeline of events and exactly what happened and why to each individual involved in the accident. All the foregoing will make up the basis of the untold number of claims that will be processed through the insurance companies and courts in the coming months and years.
Yes, johnnyC1 the investigators will definitely be “doing their maths” by way of generating numerous numerical risk assessments and reviewing risk assessments that had been produced prior to the accident for inaccuracies that may have played a part in the incident. As stated all the foregoing can take many months of dogged investigation often by way of interviewing those who witnessed and were involved in the tragedy who all too often become very distressed when asked to recall what happened on that day. Yes again johnnyC1 it’s not “rocket science” it is many long hours of hard work in often distressing circumstances for the investigation team themselves, which I can assure anyone is the case from my own experiences.
However, in the end the investigators can have the satisfaction of knowing that those damaged through injury or by way of the property they own will be compensated so far as is possible. That said, the main satisfaction for the investigators is always at the conclusion of the investigation, when they may feel that they have found out the root causes of the accident and brought into place circumstances and procedures that will ensure as far as reasonably possible that a similar accident bringing tragedy and death to so many will not occur again.
Bill
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cascaderailroad
New member
I read that it was a 1.8% grade, and the runaway consist may have been traveling far in excess of 45 mph ... some things will never be known for sure ... the exact location of the locos on the grade ... where exactly the runaway railcars became decoupled from the locos, and why they became decoulpled from the locos ... as the locos were (In Fact) no where near, or in the scene, of the balled up mess of the accordianed tankcars.snip~ The train derailed at a speed of 45mph on rails where there was a 10mph & 25mph speed restriction through curves, going down a grade of a least 1.3%.John
One reason why the locos uncoupled from rest of the train is because the tankcars had shelf type couplers, the locomotive and the car placed in between the locos and tank cars did not. In pictures of the derailment all of the tankcars are lined up together and not scattered about. Maybe the handbrakes on the tankcars were not set or not enough were set. The loco had a fire, that may have released the independent & loco brakes. The consists did not start rolling until 45min+ after the fire was put out and the train took about 30 mins to to travel 7+ miles to derail. This has all been detailed in "Trains" magazine October 2013 issue.
John
John
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